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Honorable Calvin Gould, Judge
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L. Charles Evans
Attorney for Plaintiff
520 Keams Building
Salt Lake City, ur 84101
Telephone:
801-328-2553
lli THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE STATE OF UWl

AANOVER LlliITED, a

General Partnership,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,
vs.
DeANNA FIELDS,

Defendant and
Respondent.

*
*
*
*
*
*
*

PETITION FOR REHE.ARING

Case No. 14830

CXJMES NOW the Plaintiff/Appellant and respectfully
petitions the Court for a rehearing of the above matter after an
adverse decision by this Court in favor of Defendant an
September 1, 1977.

DATED this _jk_ day of September, 1977.

L. Charles Evans
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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ii

POINTS OF ERROR

Plaintiff believes and therefore asserts that this

Court erred in its September 1, 1977 decision in the following ways:
1.

In concluding that there was adequate evidence to

support the concept of integration of the March Contract and the
July Earnest funey Agreemmt wherein the March Contract was replaced
by the latter.
2.

In not applying the doctrine of practical construction

in construing the July Earnest Money Agreerrent.

3.

In concluding that the July Earnest funey Agreemmt

was not ambiguous.
4.

In concluding that the M:l.rch Contract had failed.

5.

In concluding that Defendant had acted in good faith

in regard to the July application for financing.
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L. Charles Evans

Attoni.ey for Plaintiff
520 Keams Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone:
801-328-2553

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF lJrAH

lW~VER.

Lil1ITED, a

General Partnership,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,
vs.
I:eANNA FIELDS,

Defendant and
Respondent.

*
*
*
*
*
*
*

BRIEF IN SUPPORl' OF
PEITTION FOR REHF.ARING

Case No. 14830

On Septenber 1, 1977, this Court handed down a ruling

affirming the

l~r

court's judgrrent in favor of the Defendant.

In

doing so, the Court rejected the "ratification" and "offset" arguments
of Plaintiff as being considered for the first t:i.Ile on appeal and found
sufficient evidence to support integration of the contractual doCUIEnts
and to support Defendant's good faith in COIIplyingwith the terms of the
cbcurrents.

In finding error with the Court's ruling, Plaintiff will

not consider the rulings of the "integration" and "offset" arguments,
for there is sufficient authority to the contrary that reasonable minds
mi.ght differ.

With regard to the construction of the contracts and
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Defendant's good faith, however, Plaintiff finds the law and evidence
strongly in support of Plaintiff's position and appeals to the Court
once mre to consider Plaintiff's argurrEI1.ts in these regards.

In its Opinion, the Court stated that a comprehensive
review of the record disclosed adequate evidence to support the concep:
of :integration as well as the finding of good faith compliance with th
te:rm:i of the Agreement.

In addition, the Court stated that the Earnes:

M:m.ey Agreement was cornplete on its face and contained no ambiguities.
The Court went on to say that, since prior to the execution of

Earnest t-bney Agreement
t..~e

the parties had not been

the

able to obtain

necessary financing to accornplish the sale, it appeared perfectly

logical for the trial court to have found that, since the initial
Contract had failed, the parties agreed upon a different contractual
arrangement, which they substituted for the foruer.

Plaintiff would

like to examine the strength of each of these conclusions in light of

the appropriate law and evidence.

I

THE MARCH UNIFORM .REAL ESTATE CONI'RACT WAS 001' REPI.ACED BY
OR INI'EGRATED INl'O THE JULY EARNEST MJNEY AGREEMENI'.
To properly examine the issue of integration, one nust have
an adequate understanding of the purposes of the tbrch Uniform Real
Estate Contract and of the July Earnest funey Agreement.

The March

Contract was a sinple, short-term vehicle which enabled the Defendant
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to purchase her condominium. imlediately, while waiting to obtain
long-tenn financing at a later date.

Its purpose was to allow the

Defendant to secure and oove into her condominium even though her
initial loan application had failed.

Her down paynent was used oostly

to prepare the apartIIEnt so that she could mve in.
to pay sales conmi..ssion.

(R. 107) .

The rest was used

The contract was a ti.ma frame-

IDrk designed to enable Defendant to YiOrk out her long-term financing.
During a period of 18 IIDnths, Defendant could make as many changes in
her financial status and as many loan applications as she needed in

None of the applications, nor the

order to obtain her financing.

Earnest M:mey Agreements acconpanying them, YiOuld have supplanted the
March Contract, but YlOuld rather have operated within its boundaries.
It was not bec;ause the March c.ontract failed that the July application
for financing was made.

fail - -

To the contrary, the March Contract did not

its purpose was to be fulfilled by such an application.
Had the anticipated July loan application been able to be

processed without a new Eamest M:mey Agreement, such YlOuld have been
done.

Tne bank, however, indicated that a new Eamest Mmey Agreement

YlOuld be necessary since a new application was being made.

Plaintiff

thereupon prepared a new Earn.est M:mey AgreeIIEilt for the sole purpose
of having the loan application processed.

The Defendant testified twice

at trial that she understood the purpose of the Eamest M:mey Agreement

was to enable her to get a loan.

(R. 140).

This was no new schene.

It was forseen and intended by the March Contract.

Defendant admitted
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at trial that there was no discussion with regard to the Earnest P.oney
Agreerrent replacing the March Contract.
an expressed intention of the parties.
did the trial court

otherwise?

(R. 140).

That was never

That being the case, how

corre to the conclusion that the parties intended

The only evidence discernable to Plaintiff in possible

support of Defendant's position is

(1) Defendant's statenEnt on page

140 of the record that she assured that such would be the effect of
the new agreeI!El1t and

(2) the July F.arnest M:mey Agreerrent, itself.

II

THE JULY EARNEST MJNEY AGRID1ENT WAS AMBIGUOUS BECAUSE OF THE
lliCX>NSISTENI' ACTIONS OF THE PARTIES AFI'ER ITS EXEClJrION, AND,
WAS, THUS, SUBJECT 'ID THE OOCTRINE OF PRACTICAL CONSI'RIJCTION.
As set out in the Utah cases of Bullfrog Marina, Inc. vs.

Lentz,

501 P. 2nd 266, 28 Utah 2nd 261 (1972) , Bullough vs. Sims, 400

P.2d 20, 16 Utah 2nd 304 (1965), and Zeese vs. Estate of Seigel, 534
P.2d 85 (Utah, 1965), inconsistent actions on the part of the parties
creates an an:biguity which then enables the court to look at the
surrounding circumstances in determining the intentions of the parties.
According to the court in Bullfrog Marina, Inc. vs . Lentz, on page 271,
the interpretation given by the parties themselves shown by their acts

will be adopted by the court.

"When parties place their own construc-

tion on their agreeirent and so perform, the court may consider this as
persuasive evidence of what their true intention was. '' The court went
on to say that although the doctrine of practical construction could
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only be applied when the contract was ambiguous, such ambiguity
could be created by the actions of the parties.
''Where the parties have denxmstrated by their actions and
performance that to them the contract rreant sonething quite
different, the meaning and intent of the parties should
be enforced. In such a situation, the parties, by their
actions, have created the ambiguity to bring the rule
into operation. If this were not the rule, the courts
~uld be enforcing one contract when both parties have
derronstrated that they rreant and intended the contract
to be quite different." Bullfrog Marina v. Lentz, Ibid.
It is the strong contention of the Plaintiff that the actions
of both parties were clearly consistent with the ongoing validity of
the March Contract and clearly contrary to the idea that the Earnest

M:mey Agreerrent replaced the March Contract.

The actions which

support such a conclusion are as follows:
1.

No discussion was ever had between Plaintiff and

Defendant to the effect that the March Contract was to be replaced by the
Earnest M:mey Agreement.
2.

No mmtion was made in the July Eamest M:mey

Agreerrent about its replacing the Harch Contract.
3.

Defendant continued to make paynents on the March

Contract through October, three m:mths after the Eamest M:mey Agreemmt,
and, in November, she promised to make further payirents.
4.

Defendant asked in October if Plaintiff ~d be

willing to nndify the March Contract and even sat down with Plaintiff
to negotiate such rrodifications.
5.

The idea that the March Contract was replaced by the
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July agreement never

sa:N

light until February 17, 1976, when it

surfaced in Defendant's Answer and Counterclaim.
6.

The express purpose of the Earnest Money Agreem:nt

at the tine it was signed was to enable the loan application to be
processed.

If the loan could have been processed without the Earnest

1-bney Agreement, it would never have been prepared.
understood this purpose and has so testified.

The Defendant

(R. 140).

The case at

hand seem to fit squarely with the rulings of the Court in the ~
Bullough, and Zeese cases.

The evidence seems so clearly consistent w.

such a conclusion that Plaintiff finds it difficult to see how a diffe:

conclusion could be reached except under som: unexpressed equitable
doctrine which, if applied, should have been open to thorough exarninatic
and argurent by the parties.
The Defendant claims that the $1,000.00 loaned to the

Defendant by Plaintiff and the application for a loan at the bank were
ma.de on the validity and strength of the Earnest Money Agreement.
argurent, however, is not accurate.

That

Many loans are made on the st:rengt

of Unifo:cm Real Estate Contracts such as the one that Plaintiff and
Defendant entered into in March.

That Contract would have been used

as the expressed basis of the loan in this case and submitted to the bi:
had it not been for the fact that applications for these particular
federal m:mies had to be accorrpanied by an Earnest Mmey Agreerrent. Th
preparation of the Earnest Money Agreement, then, was ~rely a fonnalir
to enable the application to proceed.

was the t1arch Contract

The real basis for the loans

which the parties

continued to look to and to
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perform well after the July Eamest lbney Agreem:nt had been
entered into.

III

DEFENDANT DID NaI' ACT rn GOOD FAITH rn REGARD TO HER JULY
APPLICATION FDR FUNDING.
Both Plaintiff and Defendant testified at trial that the
reason given them by the bank for the turn down by M. G. I. C. was
insufficient square footage for the number of occupants in the i.mit.
(R. 86, R. 143).

The testinxm.y of the Plaintiff is that Zion's

Bank, after an error was discovered, had agreed to resubmit the

application to M.G. I.C. with the correct square footage.

(R. 86).

It was only when the bank learned that the Defendant was getting
married within ten days that they decided that they r,.iould not
resubmit the application representing Defendant as a single person.
(R. 87, R. 193) .
The Defendant briefly testified at trial that she had ma.de
application for funding at the Bank of Utah, her own bank, after her
ti.rm

down by Zion's.

was submitted.

(R. 148) .

No written evidence of such application

Plaintiff queries whether such application, in whatever

form it may have been, represented Defendant as a single~ or as
a married

r,.ioman,

If as a single ~an. why didn't Defendant continue

with her application at Zion's Bank?
of her marriage plans.

They only turned her down because

If she applied as a married ~. there would
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be obvious cause for a turn down because of a then clearly inade-

quate occupant --

square footage ratio.

When Defendant entered into the March Contract, she did so
as a single woman.

In September, Defendant stated that she was going

to remarry, although she now claims that she did not remarry.

Should

the Plaintiff be held responsible for a failure in financing brought

about by the actions of Defendant, over which it had no control?
This Court, in its Opinion, stated that the record was
devoid of any holding back or unwillingness on Defendant' s part.
Defendant's decision to remarry may not have constituted a holding bad.
or unwillingness, but it certainly was the cause of the

turn

down by

Zion's Bank and should fall within the reasoning of the court in
Wineman vs. Guilnett, 60 Wash. 2nd 831, 367 P.2d 534, 535 (1962), in
Ybi.ch the court stated that the purchaser was not entitled to recover
his Earnest funey deposit where his own fault prevented the sale.
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CONCLUSION

The evidence and law both support Plaintiff's contentions
that the March Real Estate Contract was never integrated into or
replaced by the July Earnest 11Jney Agreement.

The Judgrrent in favor

of Defendant, therefore, should be set aside with direction that
Plaintiff not be required to return Defendant's down

pa~t.

Alternately, assuming a finding that the July Earnest funey Agreemmt
replaced the March Contract, Plaintiff should not have to return the
down paynent because Defendant, herself, caused the financing to
fail.

Finally, in the alternative, the judgrrent should be reversed and

remanded for new trial.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff/Appellant requests that this Court
grant a rehearing of the above-entitled matter.

Respectfully submitted,

L. Charles Evans
Attorney for Appellant
520 Keams Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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